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The constitutional protections for commercial speech limit the ability
of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) to regulate 
the promotion of drugs in ways that have the potential to affect the 
public health.  This paper examines the areas in which the constitutional 
protections have had a significant impact on the Agency’s role, these
being Direct-Consumer (DTC) television advertisements for prescription 
drugs and the distribution to doctors by a drug manufacturers of medical 
journal articles about an unapproved use for a drug.  The commercial 
speech formula is geared toward restrictions on promotion of business
activities and does not specifically deal with safety concerns.1  Under the 
general test, though, disclosures about a safety risk can outweigh a
governmental concern in preventing harm. 
In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,2 the only Supreme 
Court case dealing with commercial speech protections for drugs, the 
Court recognized that preserving the integrity of the drug approval 
system was important to protect the public health, but it invalidated a 
restriction on advertising by pharmacies of the availability of prescription 
compounded drugs not approved by FDA.  The Court found that a
disclosure about unknown risks from the untested compound was the 
constitutionally preferred alternative to a restriction on advertising.  The 
Court also believed it “questionable” without more proof that doctors 
would prescribe an unnecessary drug in response to a patient request
prompted by an advertisement.3  Although compounded drugs are an
obscure and limited category, the Court’s rationale raises a constitutional 
question about the permissibility of a moratorium on DTC advertisements
or other speech restrictions for drugs. 
Justice Breyer, in dissent, maintained that a “more lenient application” 
of the Federal Constitution is needed, and warned against “an overly 
rigid ‘commercial speech’ doctrine” for governmental decisions that affect 
“health and safety.”4  Transforming these decisions into a constitutional
one “would involve a tragic constitutional misunderstanding” as shown by
the history in respect to the due process clause.5  Instead, for drugs, the test 
needs to be a “flexible” one that examines the restriction’s “proportionality, 
1. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 
(1980) (invalidating a restriction on promotional advertisements aimed at increasing 
electric consumption). 
2. 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
3. Id. at 374. 
4. Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
5. Id.
848
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the relation between restriction and objective, the fit between ends and
means.”6 A safety-focused proportionality test would give safety risks
more recognition.
This paper explores how a safety-focused proportionality test would
apply to the areas in which commercial speech may limit FDA’s ability
to restrict drug promotions on matters that bear on postapproval risks 
and off-label uses.7  The first issue examined is the constitutionality of a 
temporary ban or moratorium on DTC advertisements for newly approved
drugs until more information is obtained about the safety risk.  The 
premarket testing for drugs is limited in scope and cannot detect the full 
scope of risks that may occur when the drug is used for a longer period 
and by a large number of patients with more varied health conditions. 
The cardiovascular risks from Vioxx, a widely sold arthritis drug, found 
after the drug was on the market, created wide public concern about 
drug safety.8  A committee of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National 
Academy of Science favored a moratorium while surveillance on 
postmarket risks was underway but recognized that there might be
constitutional difficulties.9  Although many legal writers question the
constitutionality of a blanket moratorium based on uncertainty,10 some
believe it should be permissible11 or favor a prereview to determine if a
6. Id. at 388. 
7. This paper does not explore the extent to which the Agency would have 
authority for a moratorium under present law or the procedural measures that would be 
needed for a moratorium, important matters noted in COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE
U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. MED. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY:
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 169–70 (Alina Baciu et al. 
eds., 2007).  See Part III.C for provisions on dispute resolution enacted when the law 
was amended to expand the Agency’s authority with respect to postapproval risk. 
8. See infra Part III. 
 9. COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., supra note 7, at 
171–72. 
10. See Symposium, Thoughts on Commercial Speech: A Roundtable Discussion, 
41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 333, 347–48 (2007); see also infra Part IV.C.
11. See David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct-to-Consumer Drug 
Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 259, 288 n.154 (2007) (reporting that although
Professor Steve Shiffrin believes the Court would strike down a tailored or a general 
moratorium, Shiffrin believes both should be upheld). 
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moratorium is needed in “exceptional” cases.12  In the end, Congress did 
not adopt a moratorium, influenced by constitutional questions.13 
A temporary moratorium for DTC advertisements for newly approved
drugs presents a stronger case for being considered constitutional than
the permanent ban at issue in Western States.  The advertised drugs 
reach a wide audience and may be for chronic use, factors that increase
the potential for harm.  This paper suggests criteria for when a moratorium 
is needed based on specific risk factors, such as drugs for which risk 
signals were seen in preapproval testing, drugs for patients with special
risks, and drugs in a new therapeutic class.  The moratorium also seems
appropriate when additional testing has been specifically required by the 
Agency, including when scientific experts have a substantial concern
that the “available data indicates a potential for a serious risk” to a wide
number of patients.14  The moratorium would be for a limited time to 
enable doctors and the Agency to make a better assessment of the
postapproval risks, based on the improved postmarket surveillance 
system Congress has required.  A disclosure in the commercial that there 
may be unknown safety risks would be difficult for viewers to assess,
and it is not a substitute for the concern that Congress legitimately can 
have to prevent harm to the general public.  Indeed, as the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently found en banc, “[T]he democratic branches
are better suited to decide the proper balance between the uncertain risks
and benefits of medical technology, and are entitled to deference in
doing so.”15  Moreover, when the Agency believes that a moratorium is
needed to protect the public health, the government should seek to have 
the matter resolved directly by the Court.  The matter is too important to 
leave to the implications of cases that did not squarely deal with safety
risks to the general public. 
The paper also provides an overview of the intense dispute about the 
legal and constitutional protections for manufacturers that initiate a wide
12. See id. passim; see also infra Part IV.C.
13. See 153 CONG. REC. S5764 (daily ed. May 9, 2007) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (explaining that Senators had concerns about the constitutionality of a moratorium
even when limited to extraordinary circumstances).
14. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3) (Supp. I 2006) (authorizing a requirement for 
additional studies, including a clinical trial when needed, and the establishment of dispute
resolution procedures); see also infra Part IV.C. 
15. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).  The court in Eschenbach
found that terminally ill patients do not have a fundamental right under the Federal 
Constitution to assume the risk and obtain access to unapproved drugs that have not been
proven to be safe, and that under the rational basis test, the elected branches deserve 
deference.  Id. at 705–06, 713. 
850
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distribution of reprints about unapproved off-label uses of a drug.  At
one point, a federal district court found the distributions to be
constitutionally protected when a manufacturer makes a disclosure that 
the use had not been approved by FDA.16  The court also found it would
be “constitutional blackmail” for Congress to condition an exemption 
from the drug approval requirements on the manufacturer’s submission 
of an application to do additional studies that are needed if the
manufacturer distributes reprints on off-label uses.17  Although the 
district court decision was vacated on the basis that the FDA Guidance
Document and the statutory exemption were only an advisory safe 
harbor,18 the decision remains influential. 
At the end of the Bush administration, the Agency issued a Reprint 
Guidance stating that the Agency did not intend to consider the 
nonpromotional distribution of reprints by a company with disclosures 
about the lack of FDA approval as establishing “intent” that the product 
be used for an unapproved use.19  Although the Agency position is
ambiguous on whether it rests on statutory or constitutional grounds, or is 
an enforcement policy, if the Obama administration had revoked it, the
stage would have been set for a constitutional challenge.  That litigation 
could also have tested the difference between commercial speech and
expressive speech that receives the highest First Amendment protections.
In a recent case, Allergan v. FDA,20 the Obama administration stated 
that the Reprint Guidance “reflects FDA’s understanding” that the 
16. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74 (D.D.C. 1998). 
17. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated, 
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  The supplemental new drug application provisions were in
21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3 (Supp. III 1994). 
18. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
19. Guidance for the Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of 
Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on
Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices,
Notice of Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 1696 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at www.fda.gov/ 
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm [hereinafter Reprint Guidance].
20. Complaint at 28–33, Allergan v. FDA, No. 1:09-cv-01879-JDB (D.D.C. Jan.
11, 2010) [hereinafter Allergan Complaint].  The case concerns the off-label use of Botox to
treat spastic conditions, including those in children.  Recently, Allergen settled a fraud
and abuse case brought by the federal government concerning the marketing of off-label 
uses of Botox, and agreed to pay a $600 million penalty and “drop its First Amendment
lawsuit against . . . F.D.A.”  Natasha Singer, Maker of Botox Settles Inquiry on Off-Label 
Use, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010, at A1. 
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distribution of reprints in accordance with the Guidance “is not unlawful.”21 
According to the Agency the “nonpromotional” distribution of reprints by
manufacturers does not show an “intended use” related to an unapproved 
purpose.22  The Reprint Guidance, though, has an inappropriately narrow
position on what is “promotional,” and therefore needs to be revised.23 
In Allergan, the maker of Botox raised a broad claim that any FDA ban
on advertisements or claims for an unapproved off-label use—even
those not based on reprints—is unconstitutional when the claim is
truthful and not misleading.24  Moreover, FDA cannot constitutionally 
restrict the manufacturer’s truthful claims about off-label uses that are 
“widely accepted” and are reimbursed as “medically-accepted” in 
government programs.25  The company also raised a narrower issue that 
the FDA should not be able to preclude a company from providing
information to doctors about ways to reduce risks from an off-label 
use.26  FDA, though, recognizes that companies can provide warning 
information about off-label risks in a nonpromotional way.27  Because this
case can be resolved on narrower grounds based on the appropriateness 
of adding risk information, the Court should not reach the broader
constitutional issues.  The Agency should also reconsider the Bush 
Reprint Guidance and its narrow test for what is promotional, even
though that may give rise to constitutional challenges. 
The scope of the issues raised in Allergan makes it appropriate to 
reexamine the broader question of when a manufacturer should be able 
to make claims or distribute reprints about an off-label use.  This Article 
explores in Part V.D the kind of restrictions that should be accepted 
under the “safety-focused” proportionality test, suggested by the dissent
in Western States,28 when a company seeks to make wide distributions of 
21. Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion To Dismiss or for Summary Judgment 
and Response to Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 21–24, Allergan v. FDA, No. 
1:09-cv-01879-JDB (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Allergan Government Reply]. 
22. Id. at 9–10. 
23. See infra Part V.C.
24. Allergan Complaint, supra note 20, at 29 (claiming the First Amendment
protects truthful nonmisleading speech about an off-label use even when made in a
commercial advertisement).
25. Id. at 34–35. 
26. Id. at 21. 
27. Id. at 7, 20.  FDA regulations also allow a drug company to add warnings in
advance of FDA approval by filing a “change being effected” supplemental NDA with 
the Agency. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(1) (2008). 
28. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 378–87 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting). 
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reprints about off-label uses.29  This approach builds on that accepted by 
Congress in the past as an alternative, although that approach led to 
complex and inconclusive litigation.30  Under this alternative, the use of 
better disclosures, and Agency review of the disclosures, would be the 
first step.  When manufacturers distribute reprints about studies on off-
label uses funded by them, they should disclose factors that affect the 
assessment of the reliability of the reprinted article.  This includes 
disclosures of funding of any “ghostwriters” who substantially contributed 
to the article but who are not listed as authors.31  The manufacturer 
should also be obliged to submit further data to the Agency to support 
the use when the disclosures indicate that the need for more study to 
evaluate a potential safety risk. 
In theory, as discussed in Part V, an off-label use, based on studies 
and reprints from a medical journal, accompanied by disclosures, might 
with time even become generally recognized as safe and effective 
(GRAS/E) and not even need formal prior Agency approval.32  On the  
other hand, an off-label use described in reprints could raise potential
safety risks beyond those considered when the drug was initially 
approved.  Given this reality, to have general recognition, the 
postapproval experience and risks from off-label uses promoted by a 
manufacturer need to be monitored in a way that warrants an Agency
role.  The discussion in Part V closes by suggesting that Congress provide 
research incentives to encourage manufacturers to obtain approval of a 
supplemental new drug application (NDA) for an off-label use based on 
adequate research and postapproval risk surveillance.  Congress should 
not be constitutionally limited to being able to require disclosures about
potentially misleading claims and the possibility for added unknown 
risks.  Exploring new approaches to deal with off-label promotion reflects
the important role Congress and the Agency have to adapt the law to
29. The safety risk could exist because of the harm directly caused or could be an 
indirect risk because of weak support for a claimed health benefit. 
30. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3 (Supp. III 1994) (expired pursuant to Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 111 Stat. 2364 (1997), and 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Nov. 20, 1998)); supra notes 
16–18; infra Part V.A. 
31. See Duff Wilson, Medical Schools Quizzed on Ghostwriting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2009, at B2 (criticizing as plagiarism articles written by those not named as authors);
see also infra Parts III.A, V.D. 
32. See infra Part V.A.1. 
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deal with new problems in a way that promotes the availability of safe 
and effective new uses for drugs.33 
The history of Vioxx, as discussed in this paper, illuminates not only 
the problem of postmarket risks but also the interplay between reprints 
and Agency review.34  Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx, actually 
sought FDA approval for an off-label use that had been favorably
reviewed in an article in the New England Journal of Medicine.35  The 
Agency found that the drug had a potential for causing cardiovascular
risks, a potential that the Journal writers had discounted at the time.36 
The Agency required a precaution on the drug’s label and further
monitoring, and that monitoring demonstrated that the drug had an 
increased incidence of adverse cardiovascular effects.37  The lesson drug
companies might draw from this history, though, is that they should not 
seek Agency approval for an off-label use. Instead, they may fund 
research on the off-label use, encourage publication in a medical journal, 
and then rely on the First Amendment to justify distributing reprints to
doctors with disclosures about the lack of FDA approval.  That unfortunate 
result would be a loss for the public. 
Drug manufacturers may have a special concern about a moratorium 
or restrictions on the distribution of reprints because they seek to reach
the full market potential for the drug as soon as possible in order to 
recoup the large cost of drug development while the drug is still under 
patent.  Although the business need should not trump safety or establish 
the scope of the First Amendment, the economic concern with the 
“ticking patent clock” needs to be recognized.  If a policy solution is 
needed, though, it is one for Congress to consider.  The legislature can 
investigate the seriousness of the concern and has means to address it in
ways that are beyond the judicial sphere.  For example, Congress might
extend the brand drug’s exclusivity for a limited period to reflect a 
33. For an expansive view of the Agency’s role in interpreting the law to promote 
the statutory purpose, see United States v. Article of Drug, Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 
798–800 (1969); United States v. N.S. Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 246–48 (2d Cir. 
1977); Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 177 (1973). 
34. See Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures 
and Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941, 947–51 (2007); see also infra Part III.B. 
35. Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of
Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1520, 1525–27 (2000). 
 36. David Armstrong, The New England Journal Missed Vioxx Warnings Signs, 
WALL ST. J., May 15, 2006, at A1 (describing different assessment and later retraction by
the Journal). 
 37. Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 948–51. 
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moratorium on advertising.38  Congress might also consider whether
stronger research incentives are needed to encourage manufacturers to
seek approval for new uses of marketed drugs, instead of distributing 
reprints about off-label uses.39 
This is an important time to reexamine the constitutional appropriateness 
of speech restrictions involving health and safety regulation.  Academics 
are beginning to reassess and debate whether the constitutional protections
for drugs go too far or are not extensive enough.40  Drug regulation may 
also receive more public attention in the wake of the congressional 
efforts to reform health-care financing.  Although major legislative
changes typically occur after a tragedy or crisis, an understanding of the
limits on Congress’s power remains important.  The position of this paper 
is that the safety concerns that underlie drug regulation are significant 
public interests that deserve more weight than the economic and
competitive factors involved in most commercial speech litigation.
Instead of a single general theory for commercial speech, there is a need
38. One approach might be to allow an extension of market exclusivity for a 
month or two in order to take into account the effect a moratorium has on the ability to
recoup drug costs during the remaining patent term.  See infra Part IV.D.
39. See infra Part V.G.
40. For concern about the scope of commercial speech, see Paul D. Carrington, 
Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167, 1188–92 (2001), identifying 
difficulties of extending commercial speech protections to DTC advertising; Margaret 
Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 815 passim (2000),
criticizing constitutional limits on Congress’s powers to restrict speech to protect against
health risks; Earl M. Maltz, The Strange Career of Commercial Speech, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 
161, 171 (2003), tracking the shift of support for the doctrine from liberals to 
conservatives and criticizing both for activism; Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of
Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2585–87 (2008), criticizing any
expansion of commercial speech protections.  For a discussion that restrictions on
nondeceptive commercial speech should be “an extreme last resort,” see Symposium,
supra note 10, at 347–48 (2007) (quoting remarks of Kathleen Sullivan, a self-described
“strong supporter” of commercial speech).  For support of a broader scope of
constitutional protections for experimental drugs, see Richard A. Epstein, Cancer
Patients Deserve Faster Access to Life-Saving Drugs, WALL ST. J., May 2–3, 2009 at 
A11.  For a range of perspectives, see Symposium on Commercial Speech and the Public
Interest, HEALTH MATRIX (forthcoming 2010), and Symposium on Marketing Health:
The Growing Role of Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation, 37 AM. J. L. &
MED. (forthcoming 2011). See also ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., 2010 ANNUAL MEETING:
CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH LAW: PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AND COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH 8 (2010), available at http://www.aals.org/am 2010/brochure1.pdf. 
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to “think small” about particular types of issues.41  From that perspective,
regulation that affects public safety deserves special attention and weight. 
To develop the analysis, Part II will provide an overview of the key
elements of the statutory framework for premarket approvals and
prescription statuses of drugs.  That discussion will summarize the evolution
of FDA’s policy for allowing DTC advertisements, a development 
influenced by the recognition of commercial speech protections. 
Part III will review the reasons why postapproval risks are found for 
drugs notwithstanding the preapproval testing for them and review the 
Vioxx history.  The recommendations of the IOM committee and the
legislative changes to improve FDA’s ability to respond to postsafety
risks will be summarized. 
Part IV will explore the issues on whether a moratorium on television 
advertisements for newly approved prescription drugs would be
constitutional.  Although Congress considered a moratorium, it did not 
enact one.  The discussion considers the differences between a moratorium
and the pharmacy compounding at issue in Western States, and identifies 
the circumstances when a moratorium is most needed. 
Part V considers the manufacturer’s distribution of medical reprints 
about off-label uses in light of the Agency’s policy on what is relevant to 
demonstrate an intended use for an unapproved purpose.  The discussion 
covers the need for additional disclosures to ensure that the distribution is
not misleading.  The discussion also covers the extent to which the Agency
should be able to require additional testing if the available information 
indicates that the new off-label use poses significant risks or needs
postmarket surveillance.  The role for research incentives will be noted. 
The conclusion in Part VI reviews how a proportionality test provides
a justification for delaying some television advertisements pending
postmarket surveillance.  Moreover, when the manufacturer widely
distributes reprints about off-label uses, disclosures seem needed about 
factors that can affect the assessment of the reliability of the studies.  The
Agency should be able to require more studies, postmarket surveillance, 
and disclosures when needed to assess the risks, including factors that
indicate that the drug does not have the safety benefit it claims to have. 
This paper provides an illustration of how a safety-focused proportionality 
test can work in practice and the challenges involved.
 41. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1215 (1984). 
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II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR DRUG APPROVALS,
PRESCRIPTION STATUS, AND DTC ADVERTISEMENTS 
This Part will provide an overview of the provisions that govern the 
testing needed for FDA approval of a new drug, the criteria governing 
the prescription status of a drug, and FDA guidance for advertising
prescription drugs to consumers on television. 
A.  History of Standards for Approval
1.  Early Efforts To Prohibit Deception and the Challenges 
When the Federal Food and Drug Act was first enacted in 1906, it 
prohibited misleading labeling, but the prohibition was interpreted by
Justice Holmes to apply only to misstatements of ingredients because of
constitutional doubts about Congress’s ability to regulate “where opinions
are far apart.”42  In 1916, the Court upheld a prohibition against “false
and fraudulent” claims,43 and in 1937, Congress once again barred
misleading claims, a prohibition still in effect.44  Material omissions are
considered in determining deception.  This time the prohibition was
found to be constitutional when challenged.45 
2.  Preapproval Safety Requirement 
The law was strengthened in 1938 in response to a tragedy.  Nearly 
ninety people died when a drug company used antifreeze as the inactive 
ingredient in a new liquid form of a sulfa drug without any testing or 
investigation of the risks.46 Premarket testing for safety was required for 
drugs not generally recognized as safe, as well as a submission of a 
NDA to the Agency.  The Agency’s powers were weak, though, because 
the application was automatically approved after a waiting period if the 
Agency did not act. 
42. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 498 (1911). 
43. Seven Cases of Eckman’s Alt. v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 517 (1916). 
44. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2006); see also id. § 321(n) (2006) (making material 
omissions relevant in determining deception). 
45. Research Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 167 F.2d 410, 422–23 (9th Cir. 1948). 
46. David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative 
History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1939). 
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3. Modern Premarket Testing and Approval Requirements 
In 1962, the sleeping pill thalidomide, which was pending review at
FDA, was found to cause birth defects in Europe.47  Congress responded 
by strengthening the statute in several ways, the first being that the
Agency must affirmatively approve the drug before it can be sold.  The
law also went beyond requiring that the drug be safe by requiring that it 
be effective.  Modern drugs have powerful ingredients that can cause
harm, and the determination of safety has to be made on a risk-benefit 
basis.  The law also required that the efficacy showing be based on 
“adequate and well-controlled investigations” contained in a NDA that
show that the drug is effective as well as safe for its intended use.48  The
tests to obtain drug approval are lengthy and costly.49  Nonetheless, the
pharmaceutical industry is profitable, and in 2000, it was reported to be 
the most profitable industry in the country.50 
4.  Concern with Faster Determinations 
Congress and the Agency have sped up the process by providing for 
expedited approval of “fast-track” drugs, such as AIDS and cancer
drugs, that treat unmet medical needs.51 The law has also provided that
drug companies filing an NDA are to pay user fees to permit the Agency 
to hire more medical reviewers to enable more timely action on the 
application.52  The Agency has established goals for the time it should 
take to act on the NDA.53  The user fees need to be renewed every five
years, which leads to an opportunity for Congress to review the Agency’s 
approach to regulation.  As a result, a number of changes and compromises
have been added to the drug provisions to deal with contentious issues, 
 47. Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185, 191
n.45 (1971). 
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)–(e) (2006 & Supp. I 2006).  For a history of the approval 
requirements, see Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of 
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996).  For a description of the approval 
process, see James N. Czaban & Geoffrey M. Levitt, Drugs: INDs and Full NDAs, in
FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 317, 318–19 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 2008). 
49. See Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., How New Drugs Move Through the 
Development and Approval Process (Nov. 1, 2001), http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/ 
how_new_drugs_move.pdf (discussing an $800 million cost estimate over ten to fifteen years). 
 50. M. Angell, Editorial, The Pharmaceutical Industry—To Whom Is It Accountable?, 
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1902, 1903 (2000). 
51. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2006); Margaret Gilhooley, Heal the Damage: Prescription 
Drug Consumer Advertisements and Relative Choices, 38 J. HEALTH L. 1, 8–13 (2005)
(reviewing the scope of testing standards). 
52. See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 678–84 (3d ed. 2007). 
53. Id. at 679–81. 
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including the provisions on compounded drugs that were at issue in 
Western States.54 
B.  Prescription Status
Since 1951, the law has expressly provided for limiting drugs to 
prescription status when the drug is not safe for use except under
medical supervision because of its toxicity or “collateral measures.”55 
Collateral measures arise when a drug masks symptoms of a more
serious condition and delays treatment.56  Nonprescription drugs are the
familiar ones, found on the shelves in drug stores and supermarkets, and 
sold over the counter (OTC).  The underlying philosophy of prescription 
status is that adequate directions for lay use cannot be written.57  That  
philosophy has some tension with the increased role that DTC advertising
creates for patients. 
C.  DTC Advertisements and Role of Guidance Documents 
The statute provides for advertising drugs to physicians, not consumers,
and the statute calls for a “true statement” of information in a “brief 
summary” of the “side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness” of
the drug.58  The Agency regulations implementing this requirement 
called for disclosures that track the approved small-print labeling for the 
drug.59  The need to cover all that information made any television 
advertising to doctors or consumers impractical.
“[F]aced with threats of legal challenge”60 in 1995, FDA issued
guidance documents providing alternatives that made DTC advertisements 
feasible.  Although the nature of the legal challenge is not specified, it 
clearly would have been a commercial speech challenge.  The revised 
guidance provided for identifying the “most important risk information” in
54. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 364 (2002). 
55. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2006). 
56. See United States v. Article of Drug Labeled Decholin, 264 F. Supp. 473, 483– 
84 (E.D. Mich. 1967). 
57. See Peter Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 91, 97 (1979). 
58. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006). 
59. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 52, at 555–57. 
60. Id. at 557. 
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the television advertisement and providing the full text of the drug labeling
through a print advertisement in a consumer magazine or other means.61 
The DTC advertisements can raise other problems.  The advertisements 
may give the viewer an impression that the drug has a greater benefit 
than it has.  Disclosures may be needed in the advertisement that the 
doctor may want to consider other drugs whose risks and benefits are 
better known.62  A “fact box” may be needed on the limited benefit that
the advertised drug may provide.63  The Agency is also seeking to limit 
commercials that use distracting images when warnings are given.64 
Although some may dispute whether these matters need regulation, they do 
not directly raise commercial speech issues when they involve deception, 
and thus the need for these changes is not the focus of this paper.65 
III. POSTAPPROVAL RISKS: LESSONS FROM VIOXX, THE IOM REPORT,
AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON SURVEILLANCE AND  
THE AGENCY’S AUTHORITY 
This Part provides an overview of why drugs may be found to have 
additional risks after they are approved by FDA and the efforts to 
develop an appropriate response.  The postmarket risks found for Vioxx, 
a widely used arthritis drug, are noted because the drug illustrates the 
problem with postmarket risks.  The withdrawal of the drug from the 
market by the manufacturer led to public and legislative concern.66 FDA 
asked the IOM to study drug safety and make recommendations.67 
61. Id. at 557–58; Gilhooley, supra note 51, at 17–20. 
 62. COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., supra note 7, at 171.
63. Lisa M. Schwartz et al., Using a Drug Facts Box To Communicate Drug 
Benefits and Harms: Two Randomized Trials, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 516 (2009);
see Marvin M. Lipman, Bias in Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Its Effect on Drug
Safety, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 761 (2006) (providing a critical evaluation by the chief
medical adviser for Consumers Union, the publisher of Consumers Report); Natasha 
Singer, Prescriptions; Overhauling Drug Labels, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2009, A13 (reporting a
health reform proposal to include a chart for drugs, like the nutritional labeling on foods). 
64. Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertisements; Presentation of the
Major Statement in Television and Radio Advertisements in a Clear, Conspicuous, and 
Neutral Manner, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,376 (proposed Mar. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 202); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PRESENTING RISK 
INFORMATION IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE PROMOTION 5, 19–20 (2009). 
65. FDA’s authority over health claims on foods and dietary supplements has also
been restricted on commercial speech grounds, but the matter is not discussed here because
the products are not drugs.  See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
66. See FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 49–57 (2004) (statement of Dr. Sandra Kweder, Acting 
Director, Office of New Drugs, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research) [hereinafter
Fin. Comm. Report]; Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 941. 
 67. COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., supra note 7, at ix. 
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Congress changed the law to provide for more postmarket surveillance 
of risks and expand the Agency’s authority to require new warnings and
additional testing.  Congress considered but did not enact a moratorium
on DTC advertisements, as discussed in the next Part. 
A.  Limits of Testing 
FDA has long recognized the limits of the preapproval testing for 
drugs.  In 1964, Commissioner George Larrick stated that the initial period
of drug marketing represents “a final step in the testing of the product” 
and that there is “no way to duplicate fully in clinical trials the great
variety” of conditions under which an approved drug will be used.68 
In the IOM Report, a committee of the IOM found that the limits on 
the ability to detect the full risks are “inherent” in the system and 
“cannot be changed without adding considerably to the time and expense 
of drug approvals, which would delay patient access to potentially
beneficial drugs.”69  The studies are aimed primarily at establishing efficacy 
rather than safety.70  The IOM Report also found that the preapproval
studies do not provide information on long-term exposure, and they do 
not represent the “full array of the patients” who will use the drug 
including those with various illnesses.71 To deal with these drawbacks, 
the committee recommended improvements be made in the postmarket 
surveillance of the risks and the Agency’s ability to act when new risks 
are found.72 
B.  Vioxx as an Illustration of the Testing System
Vioxx has become the poster child for understanding the modern
system of testing and its limits.  An overview of its history is instructive 
on many issues, including medical articles about off-label uses.
68. Drug Safety Part One: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Gov’t Operations, 88th Cong. 152 (1964) (statement of George Larrick, FDA Comm’r),
as reprinted in HUTT ET AL., supra note 52, at 686. 




72. Id. 110–15, 169–70. 
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1.  Initial Approval and Scope of Testing
Vioxx, which was made by Merck, was initially approved by FDA as 
a painkiller for acute and arthritis pain.73  The studies needed to show
that effectiveness in eliminating pain did not have to be lengthy studies,
and one expert later testified about the limited scope of the testing done 
at the time of approval for a drug for chronic use.74  An FDA reviewer did 
a meta-analysis of the various studies and found that the cardiovascular
side effects were the most frequently reported serious adverse effects.75 
This observation was reported in the publicly available medical reviewer’s
summary but was not included in the labeling. 
2.  Bleeding Prevention Benefit Study and the New England  
Journal of Medicine (NEJM) Article 
a.  VIGOR Study 
When Vioxx was approved for pain, there were some preliminary
indications and hopes that, as a COX-2 inhibitor, it might reduce the 
serious problems of stomach bleeding that can occur with painkillers for 
chronic use.  Merck sponsored the VIGOR study, a controlled outcome 
study, to show that it would have this benefit, in comparison to naprosyn, 
the existing alternative for arthritis pain.  The benefit was shown, but 
Vioxx had a higher incidence of cardiovascular effects at a high dose.76 
That dose was above the level at which it was intended to be used but 
had been included in the test as a way to identify better its effectiveness.77 
b.  NEJM Publication of the VIGOR Study 
The NEJM published the results of the VIGOR study, whose chief 
researcher worked for Merck, with a favorable review.78  The article
attributed the higher incidence of cardiovascular effects to the “protective”
effect of naprosyn.  After the article was published, the use of Vioxx 
73. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Sequence of Events with Vioxx, Since Opening of
IND, http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4090B1_04_E-FDA-TAB-
C.htm (last visited June 12, 2010); Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 944–54. 
74. Ensuring Drug Safety: Where Do We Go from Here?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 109th Cong. 42, 98 (2005) (statement of Dr.
Bruce Psaty, University of Washington, on the limited testing for a drug for chronic use).
75. See Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 946. 
 76. Bombardier et al., supra note 35, at 1520. 
 77. Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 947. 
78. See Bombardier et al., supra note 35, at 1520, 1527. 
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expanded.  Merck had also purchased most of the 900,000 reprints made 
of the article.79 
3.  FDA Action on Supplemental NDA 
Merck actually sought FDA’s approval for the bleeding benefit shown 
by the VIGOR study by filing a supplemental NDA.  The Agency agreed
that the study supported the new efficacy claim but did not accept that 
naprosyn had a protective effect that accounted for the increased incidence
of cardiovascular effects for Vioxx shown in the study.80  After a long
period of intense negotiation, the Agency approved the claim for the new 
benefit.  However, it required a precaution in the label that cardiovascular 
effects were seen at a higher dose than that intended for use, that the
significance was “unknown,” and that no further study was being done.81 
4.  Finding of Cardiovascular Effects and Withdrawal of Vioxx 
At FDA’s request, Merck undertook to monitor the cardiovascular risks
from Vioxx in an ongoing Merck study that aimed to show that the drug
had a benefit in preventing colon cancer.  During the study, the evaluators
found that those receiving the drug had a statistically significant increased
incidence of cardiovascular effects compared to the control group.82 
Merck stopped the study and withdrew Vioxx from the market voluntarily
because the life-threatening cardiovascular risks to the intended users
outweighed the benefit that might be expected.83 
 79. Armstrong, supra note 36, at A1 (reporting that the medical journal sold more
than 900,000 reprints for at least $697,000 and that Merck bought most of the reprints). 
 80. Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 947–48. 
 81. PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2110 (58th ed. 2004); Gilhooley, supra note 34, 
at 948–49. 
82. Memorandum from John K. Jenkins, M.D. & Paul J. Seligman, M.D., M.P.H.
through Steven Galson, M.D., M.P.H. at 3 (Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders
/ucm106201.pdf [hereinafter Decision Memorandum]; Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 950. 
83. Fin. Comm. Report, supra note 66, at 65 (statement of Raymond Gilmartin, 
Chairman, President and CEO of Merck); Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 950.  A wide number of
product liability suits were brought against Merck, but these are not the subject of this paper.
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5.  FDA Response on Class Effects
FDA found that the cardiovascular finding for Vioxx was best interpreted
as a class effect that also applied to Celebrex, a COX-2 drug made by 
Pfizer.84  In addition, the effect extended to nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory
(NSAID) drugs like naprosyn, including its over-the-counter version, 
Aleve.85  The Agency did not seek to withdraw all these drugs from the 
market and instead required a prominent boxed warning about the 
cardiovascular risk on all drugs in the class.
6.  The Role of FDA Review and Journal Articles 
The history of Vioxx illuminates how the Agency review process 
compares even to that for an elite journal.  The NEJM later acknowledged 
that the finding of a protective effect for naprosyn was incorrect.86  It  
also illustrated the different interpretations that can be made by experts 
in making scientific assessments about controlled studies and the limits 
those studies can have.  That experience would seem to show the value
of both types of review. 
C.  Congress’s Legislative Response 
The withdrawal of Vioxx and the cardiovascular warnings for NSAID
drugs created widespread public concern.  At FDA’s request, an IOM
committee made recommendations. Congress enacted changes in the law
to improve postmarket surveillance and expand the Agency’s authority 
in many of the ways discussed in the IOM Report.  Congress’s nonaction 
on a moratorium for DTC advertisements is discussed in the next Part. 
1.  Electronic Surveillance and Testing Requirements 
Congress acted to improve the Agency’s ability to find postmarket
risks and authorized the Agency to establish a “Postmarket Risk
Identification and Analysis System.”87  This active surveillance system’s 
purpose is to datamine the electronic records of Medicare and the 
records of private insurers, when available.88  The aim was to have the
 84. Decision Memorandum, supra note 82, at 2. 
85. Id. at 11. 
 86. Armstrong, supra note 36, at A1.  See Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 948. 
87. FDA Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 945 (2007) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C) (Supp. I 2010)).
 88. COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., supra note 7, at 
114; Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Drug Testing, 
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system cover the records of 100 million patients by 2012.89  The drug 
manufacturers pay “user fees” to provide the financial resources to 
enable the government to establish the new surveillance system.90 
2.  Expanded Agency Authority 
a.  Requirements for New Testing and Warnings
Congress gave the Agency specific authority to require postmarket
studies, including clinical studies, for newly approved drugs if needed to 
assess risk signals and “to identify an unexpected serious risk when 
available data indicates the potential for a serious risk.”91  Similar studies
can be required for drugs already on the market if there is “new safety
information.”92  The Agency must establish dispute resolution procedures
to permit appeals by those who disagree with the requirement.93 
As part of a risk evaluation and management strategy, the Agency can 
also require warnings about new safety risks.94  The Agency did not have 
this specific authority earlier and had to negotiate changes that led to the 
criticism that the precaution given about the cardiovascular risks from 
Vioxx was “tepid.”95  The Agency can also find that, as part of a strategy, 
there is a need for patient labeling or a “communication plan” with
doctors.96  No provision is made, though, for a DTC moratorium. 
b.  New Enforcement Authority 
The Agency also cited the procedural hurdles it has faced in taking 
tough enforcement action.  A formal administrative process is required 
Risk Signals, Preemption, and the Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 347, 363– 
64 (2008). 
89. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B)(i)(II) (Supp. I 2007). 
 90. Gilhooley, supra note 88, at 363. 
91. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(B) (Supp. I 2007).  Electronic surveillance must not be 
sufficient to assess the risk. 
92. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355-1(b)(3)(A), 355(o)(3)(C) (Supp. I 2007); Gilhooley, supra
note 88, at 364–65. 
93. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(F) (Supp. I 2007). 
94. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (Supp. I 2007). 
95. See Marcia Angell, Your Dangerous Drugstore, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 8, 2006,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/jun/08/your-dangerous-drugstore/. 
96. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(e) (Supp. I 2007). 
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to remove an approved drug from the market because of safety risks.97 
When the Agency believes the labeling is misleading because it fails to
warn of a new risk, the Department of Justice or U.S. Attorney brings 
the lawsuit to make the legal challenge on this basis.98  Congress has 
now authorized the Agency to bring an administrative proceeding to 
impose substantial civil money penalties if a manufacturer fails to 
comply with a requirement to do more testing or to add a warning.99 
The next Part deals with the nonenactment of a DTC moratorium and 
the constitutional issues that played a role in not enacting the moratorium.
IV. CONGRESS’S NONADOPTION OF A MORATORIUM ON DTC
ADVERTISEMENTS: WOULD A MORATORIUM BE
CONSTITUTIONAL? 
When Congress strengthened the law to deal with the potential for 
postmarket safety risks dramatized by Vioxx, Congress did not include
a moratorium on DTC advertising because of concerns about its
constitutionality.  The discussion in this Part examines Western States
for its relevance on the constitutionality of a moratorium and other 
speech restrictions on drugs.  The discussion will then examine the scope 
of a moratorium that is most proportional to the need.
A.  IOM Recommendation and Debate: Moratorium for        
Specific Risks and During the Initial Period 
Overall, the IOM’s recommendations on improving postapproval risk 
assessment for drugs covered a number of measures that the Agency
should be able to require, including additional drug safety testing and a 
moratorium on DTC advertising.  These measures were to “match the
specific safety concerns and benefits presented by the drug product.”100 
In a separate recommendation, the IOM stated that FDA “should
restrict” DTC advertising in the initial period after a drug is approved.101 
According to the committee, that delay may be needed because the
advertising has the ability “to dramatically increase the uptake of a 
newly approved drug [and in some cases,] expose larger numbers of
97. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).  A hearing can be held after a suspension for an
imminent hazard but that requires a nondelegable determination by the Secretary.
98. See Gilhooley, supra note 34, at 957. 
99. 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(4) (Supp. I 2007); Gilhooley, supra note 88, at 365–66. 
 100. COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., supra note 7, at 169.
101. Id. at 171. The period was tied to the time when a special symbol would 
appear in the physician labeling to indicate that the drug was new. 
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people” to potential risks.102  The committee stated that it “would favor 
imposition of a formal moratorium,”103 but recognized that it might be
“inconsistent with First Amendment protections of commercial speech”
and supported disclosures on the limits of the data if that were the 
case.104  In the end the Senate did not include a moratorium in the law,
with Senator Kennedy explaining that Senators had concerns about its 
constitutionality.105 
B.  Constitutionality of a Moratorium and Western States:           
What Difference Does Safety Make? 
1.  Commercial Speech Prongs
The framework for the general analysis of commercial speech cases is
the one identified in Central Hudson: that the government must have a 
substantial government interest, the restriction in question directly advances 
that interest, and it must not “be more extensive than necessary.”106 
The commercial speech cases in the Supreme Court have largely 
involved permanent limits on price advertisements by competitors and
advertising limits on professionals and other types of economic
regulation that generally have not dealt with public safety.107  The ability to 
relate the cases to the drug context can be difficult.  Thus, in determining 
the need for a moratorium, a precedent exists in the Court’s upholding a 
limited thirty-day time bar on lawyers contacting the families of those 
killed in accidents.108  The need for that delay relates to the common human
experience of grief.  The reason for a moratorium on drug advertisements
relates to a scientific model that puts the burden for testing on the maker 
of a new claim.  The Supreme Court has also dealt with commercial speech 
restrictions with a safety rationale in the case of state restrictions on the
promotion of tobacco in an effort to protect youths.  However, the




 105. 153 CONG. REC. S5764 (daily ed. May 9, 2007) (statement of Senator Kennedy). 
106. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).  The first prong prohibits false, misleading, or unlawful speech, but this is rarely at
issue. See id. 
107. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 365–68 (2002). 
108. Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995). 
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that is not involved with a moratorium that is aimed at protecting the 
intended users.109  
2.  Western States and Its Scope 
The most pertinent case in examining how commercial speech applies to 
FDA health and safety regulation is Western States.110 Although the case
dealt with an advertising ban for a limited category of compounded
drugs made by pharmacies, the Court noted objections that will arise if a 
moratorium on DTC advertisements were required.  The case illustrates 
the importance of identifying the government interest and the support to 
show that advertisements to patients pressure doctors to prescribe certain
medications.  The key prong, though, turns out to be the last one on whether 
a disclosure about a risk is an adequate alternative to protect the public 
from harm.
a.  Nature of Compounding and Reason for Restriction 
Pharmacies have long mixed ingredients or altered drugs to make a 
medication suited to the needs of an individual patient based on a 
doctor’s prescription.111  FDA believed compounding was appropriate and 
within the traditional practice of pharmacies when compounds were made
for individuals who have special medical needs not met by available
drugs, such as special dosage needs or allergies to a particular ingredient.
However, FDA was concerned about the expansion of compounding to 
include variations of existing drugs and especially so when the variation 
is done on a widespread basis or with the use of commercial grade 
equipment.  In line with FDA’s policy, Congress exempted compounding 
from any need for new drug approval when done by a pharmacist in
conjunction with a doctor’s prescription for an identified patient, subject 
to conditions, such as that it not be done in “inordinate amounts” or be 
“essentially copies of commercially available drugs.”112 The key condition 
was that there be no advertisement to patients of the compounding for
specific drugs, although advertisements about the availability of compounding 
services were acceptable.113 
109. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 528–29 (2001). 
110. Western States, 535 U.S. at 357. 
111. Id. at 360–61. 
112. 21 U.S.C. § 353a(b)(1)(D) (2006). 
113. Id. § 353a(c) (2006). 
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b.  The Central Hudson Test and the Majority’s Initial        
Analysis of the Test 
The majority and the dissent differed on the basis for the government’s
action and the support for it.  This led to a complicated level of analysis, 
which needs to be sorted out to understand the rigor of the test that may
apply in future disputes. 
i.  Substantial Government Interest
The Court accepted that the government had identified a substantial 
interest in protecting the integrity of the new drug approval process 
while preserving the availability of compounded drugs for particularized
medical needs.114 
ii.  Directly Advancing the Interest
The Court also assumed that an advertising ban would preclude large-scale 
manufacturing and thus “might” directly advance the line-drawing aim.115 
iii.  More Extensive than Necessary 
The problem was that the government had failed to show the ban was “‘not
more extensive than necessary.’”116  The aim could be met by nonspeech 
alternatives such as banning large-scale manufacturing equipment for 
compounding, a measure FDA had identified in an earlier policy statement. 
The Court also made the unusual suggestion that the government cap the 
profit in a specific period.117 
c.  The Dissent’s Identification of Safety as the       
Government’s Interest 
i.  Safety Interest
The dissent by Justice Breyer identified another substantial government 
interest for the advertising restriction: reducing the aggregate safety risk 
114. Western States, 535 U.S. at 368–69. 
115. Id. at 371. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 372. 
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from the unnecessary use of untested compounded drugs.118  A ban on the use
of large-scale manufacturing equipment that the majority suggested as an
alternative would not have served this additional safety interest because 
the harm could still occur if pharmacies used smaller-scale equipment. 
ii.  Advancing the Government’s Interest: Effect of       
Advertisements on Pressure and Adequacy             
of Risk Explanation 
Congress’s restriction on advertisements for compounding would 
ensure that the decision about using an untested compound would be 
made by the prescribing physician based on the patient’s need for it, without 
having the patient be influenced by an advertisement for a compound
that might be only a convenience.  To show the influence of advertisements, 
the dissent cited surveys by the Kaiser Health Foundation done with
respect to DTC advertisements.  The surveys showed that 71% of family
doctors believe the DTC advertisements “pressure[] physicians into 
prescribing drugs they would not ordinarily prescribe.”119  Another
difficulty with the advertisements identified by the dissent was that they 
might “not fully explain the complicated risks at issue.”120 
d.  Response by Majority 
i.  Hypothesized Government Interest and      
Inadequate Showing 
The majority rejected the dissent in ways that illuminate the rigor of 
the commercial speech standard for drug advertising.  The government 
had not maintained that the advertising ban was needed to prevent the
use of unnecessary drugs, and commercial speech protections were
“significantly stricter” than the rational basis test by requiring the 
government to identify a substantial interest expressly.121  The dissent’s
contention that the advertisements lead doctors to prescribe unnecessary
drugs rested on a “questionable assumption” based merely on one survey
and one magazine article.  For the majority, this was not sufficient to show 
that the restriction would “directly advance[]” the government’s concern.122 
118. Id. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
119. Id. at 384.  The survey was by the Kaiser Health Foundation, and the magazine 
was Prevention Magazine.  Id. at 383–84. 
120. Id. at 387. 
121. Id. at 373–74 (majority opinion). 
122. Id. at 374. 
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ii.  Disclosures as Alternative
To the extent the dissent was suggesting that the advertisements would 
confuse consumers about the risks that might exist, instead of banning
the advertisement, the “far less restrictive alternative” could be requiring 
a disclosure that the compounded drug had not undergone FDA testing 
and that its risks were “unknown.”123  The First Amendment calls for a
skepticism about restraints on truthful statements that “‘seek to keep
people in the dark . . . for their own good.’”124 
e.  The Dissent on Congress’s Role and Commercial Speech 
In his dissent, Breyer maintained that the commercial speech test needs:
[A] more lenient application . . . that reflects the need for distinctions among
contexts, forms of regulation, and forms of speech . . . .  Otherwise, an overly 
rigid “commercial speech” doctrine will transform what ought to be a legislative 
or regulatory decision about the best way to protect the health and safety of the 
American public into a constitutional decision prohibiting the legislature from
enacting necessary protections.125 
Notably, then-Justice Rehnquist joined the dissenters in Western States.  
He was the sole dissenter when the Court extended First Amendment
protection to commercial speech in a case striking down a state prohibition 
on drug price advertising.126  Then-Justice Rehnquist called the Court’s
approach “Lochnerian” and maintained that the free speech protections 
exist to protect “public decisionmaking as to political, social, and other 
public issues,” not commercial advertisements for shampoos or drugs.127 
Perhaps the safety concerns that arise with drug advertisements may have
led him to agree on the need for a test that gives safety more significance. 
C.  Constitutionality of a DTC Moratorium After        
Western States
If Congress were to reconsider enacting a moratorium on DTC 
advertisements, the moratorium’s scope would be an important issue.  The 
123. Id. at 376. 
124. Id. at 375 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996)).
125. Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
126. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 781–90 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
127. Id. at 787. 
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Court is unlikely to overrule its precedents, but it may recognize important 
distinctions. The safety concerns that influenced the dissent may potentially 
get more recognition in cases in which the risks are even clearer.
When Congress was considering the legislative changes, the need for a 
moratorium was debated among medical experts128 as well as legal 
experts.129  Some believed that a tailored moratorium would be upheld
when there was a reason to suspect risks from “specific, potentially high-
risk drugs”130 but that a categorical moratorium based on uncertainty 
would be found unconstitutional.131  Another legal scholar believed that
the Court should uphold both a tailored moratorium and a categorical 
one but would not do so.132 
The discussion below outlines when a moratorium seems most needed 
and whether it would satisfy the prongs of the commercial speech test. 
The focus is on the constitutional test and not on whether the agency
would have authority to require a moratorium under present law.  The 
analysis also has relevance in understanding how a safety-based
proportionality test may apply in connection with other speech restrictions
including the distribution of reprints.  Moreover, even apart from the 
constitutional issue, Congress and agencies should only regulate when
there is a reasonable need to do so, and the test has some relevance in
that determination. 
1.  Substantial Government Interest in a  
Temporary Moratorium   
a.  Criteria and Special Factors 
A moratorium is most readily justified when it is directed at drugs that 
have identifiable, specific risk factors for added serious risks.  Identifying 
special factors like these turn upon expert medical and scientific 
judgment.  Still, the category would seem to appropriately include drugs 
 128. Miriam Shuchman, Drug Risks and Free Speech—Can Congress Ban Consumer
Drug Ads?, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2236 (2007). 
129. See Symposium, supra note 10, at 335–57. 
130. See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 276–82 (describing a legislative proposal by
Senator Kennedy for a moratorium on a tailored basis for particular drugs). 
131. See Mark I. Schwartz,  To Ban or Not To Ban—That Is the Question: The 
Constitutionality of a Moratorium on Consumer Drug Advertising, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
1 (2008) (analyzing reasons why the Court would be unlikely to find a blanket
moratorium to be constitutional); Vladeck, supra note 11, at 288 (citing Professor Post). 
132. See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 288 & n.154 (citing Professor Steve Shiffrin’s 
clarification of his remarks in Shuchman, supra note 128, that although he believes the 
Court would strike down a tailored or general moratorium, both should be upheld).
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for which risk signals for serious harm were seen in the preapproval 
tests, as illustrated by the cardiovascular signals found for Vioxx.  
Another potential candidate would seem to be drugs for patients with
serious acute medical conditions who are more susceptible to harm from 
unexpected additional risks. 
A moratorium would also seem needed for drugs in a new therapeutic 
class that have a novel mechanism of action.  The novelty itself suggests 
the potential for new risks that can warrant a delay in the DTC 
advertisements.  The COX-2 inhibitors, like Vioxx and Celebrex, had a 
novel approach, which would seem to represent a new therapeutic class 
with potential risks.133  The need for a moratorium for every new molecular 
entity is not clear.  A moratorium may not be needed, for example, for a 
drug that is a minor variation or an isomer of an earlier drug, although 
the use of a higher dose could affect the assessment.134  The evaluation of 
the need turns on a medical research judgment. 
b.  Scientific Uncertainty and Public Safety 
A broader approach—having a moratorium during the initial period of
use even in the absence of specific risk factors—should also be considered
because of substantial scientific uncertainty about the potential for
postapproval risks and its effect on public safety.135  The law now allows
FDA to require additional postapproval studies to “identify an unexpected
serious risk when available data indicates the potential for a serious 
risk.”136  The Agency has to provide for dispute procedures.137  When the
Agency has made such a finding, a moratorium may also be needed.  A
moratorium permits a better assessment of the additional information
before advertising increases demand by a wide public.  If the experience 
with postmarket testing shows that significant serious and unexpected 
risks are found, there is even a stronger basis for finding that a regular 
133. See supra Part III.B.2 (describing Vioxx’s Bleeding Prevention Study). 
 134. Gilhooley, supra note 51, at 3, 26–27.  Gilhooley describes reports that the 
head of Medicare regarded Nexium to be a “game” on those who pay for drugs.  Id. at 3. 
Moreover, Nexium had a higher dose level and some added effect.  Id. at 27–28. Finally,
a scientist commented that Nexium was “identical” to the earlier drug, Prilosec, that he
had developed.  Id. at 26–27. 
135. See supra Part IV.A; see also  COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG 
SAFETY SYS., supra note 7, at 171. 
136. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(B)(iii) (Supp. I 2006); see supra Part.III.C.
137. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(F) (Supp. I 2006). 
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moratorium is warranted during the initial period of sale like that
recommended by the IOM.138 
The duration of the moratorium is also important to determining its 
proportionality.  The aim is to permit evaluation of the risk found after 
marketing, based on the improved means of postmarket surveillance and 
testing established by Congress.  A two-year time frame for the moratorium 
seems appropriate as a starting point, with the Agency being able to
shorten or lengthen it based on experience and the indicated need.139 
The electronic surveillance and other measures to track postmarket risk
are still new, and how well they will work may have an important effect
on the duration of the length of the time frame.
2.  Directly Advancing the Government Interest and    
Showing of Impact on Doctors 
The rigor of meeting the “directly advance” step has increased in recent
cases.  FDA has to show that the restriction “directly and materially
advances” its interest, and must show that the harms it seeks to prevent
“are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree.”140  Although that might be viewed as requiring a showing of
empirical evidence, the Court has also recognized that in some settings 
this test can even be met “solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple
common sense.’”141 
In the case of DTC advertisements, the added difficulty in meeting this
prong for prescription drugs is in showing that a consumer advertisement 
would pressure the doctor into acting differently.  Justice Breyer, in his dissent 
in Western States, maintained that advertisements about compounding
by pharmacies influence doctors, citing surveys from the Kaiser Health
Foundation on DTC advertisements and the amount of money spent on 
the advertisements.142  Justice O’Connor found the assumption that
doctors would be pressured by advertisements to be “questionable” and
based on only one survey and magazine article, but ultimately did not 
rely on the adequacy of the showing to resolve the case.143 
138. See COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., supra note 7, at 171. 
139. Id.
140. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) 
(citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).  See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 
268–69 (summarizing ways that the test has become more rigorous). 
141. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (citing Fla. Bar v.
Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)). 
142. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 383–84 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting); see also Part IV.B.2. 
143. Western States, 535 U.S. at 374–75 (majority opinion). 
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FDA also has stated in recent guidance that DTC advertisements can
be misleading because they contain distracting images when warnings 
are given.144  In support of its guidance, the Agency cited its 2004 survey
of doctors about DTC advertisements that “almost half of physicians feel
some pressure to prescribe as a result of DTC advertising, and patients 
and physicians report a belief that these ads overstate the drug product’s 
efficacy and do not present a fair balance of risk information.”145   A
randomized study also found that a patient who requests a specific drug 
is more likely to receive it than one who does not make such a request,
even though they describe similar symptoms.146  The amount spent on
DTC advertising by itself is also an indicator of the influence it has.  The 
spending reached $4.1 billion in 2005, compared to $12 million in 1997.147 
3.  Disclosures as an Adequate Alternative
Still, the determinative issue is likely to be whether a moratorium is
more extensive than necessary because a disclosure to consumers about
the potential for additional risks may be an adequate alternative.  An
important problem with the disclosure approach, though, is that until
more information is available about the postapproval risk, the doctor 
cannot make a fully confident decision on how widely the drug should 
be used.  DTC advertisements can minimize the doctor’s role and might 
seem to put the burden on the doctor to justify why a drug should not be 
used in the face of uncertainty and emerging information.  For newly 
approved drugs with risk factors, though, until more is known, the doctor 
should have the initiative to determine the patients for whom the drug is 
appropriate based on individual factors.  In any case, it is reasonable for 
Congress to decide that approach is better. 
 144. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 64, at 5.
145. Id. at 2 n.4 (citing KATHRYN J. AIKIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DTC
PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS—SUMMARY OF FDA SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS, 
2–8 (2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ScienceResearch/Research 
Areas/DrugMarketingAdvertisingandCommunicationsResearch/UCM152860.pdf.  Regarding
a preliminary survey on whether patients would seek the drug from other doctors, see
Gilhooley, supra note 51, at 18 n.79. 
146. Richard L. Kravitz et al., Influence of Patients’ Requests for Direct-to-Consumer
Advertised Antidepressants, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1995, 1999 (2005) (reporting results 
of actors who went to a doctor’s office describing similar symptoms). 
 147. HUTT ET AL., supra note 52, at 558 n.1 (citing Rich Thomaselli, Nothing but 
Blue Skies?, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 2, 2006, at 3, 51). 
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Simply providing for a disclosure that there may be additional risks 
will tend to be a boilerplate statement that does not convey the
complicated judgment the doctor has to make.  If the commercial speech
doctrine necessitates the disclosure alternative, the advertisement should
reflect the one recommended by the IOM that the data on the risks and
benefits from the advertised drug “are less extensive” than alternatives
with longer use.148  Moreover, the advertisement should expressly state
that in some cases doctors may want to advise “caution” until more risk
information is available.149 
4.  Wider Public Health Impact: Differences from              
Western States
The larger picture is that television advertisements for prescription 
drugs have a greater potential to impact the public at large. The
advertisements reach a larger audience.  The drugs generally involve new 
molecules or have some new use.  Western States dealt with a more 
limited potential for risk to the public health, from special compounds to 
meet individual needs, as well as a permanent ban on consumer
advertisements.  When the Agency believes a temporary moratorium is
needed to protect the public health, the government should pursue efforts 
to require one.  The public interest in a moratorium should be resolved
on its merits in a direct test, rather by reading the implications of cases 
with a more limited focus. 
D.  Ticking Patent Clocks and a Moratorium 
A moratorium aimed at protecting consumers will likely have an
economic impact on drug companies.  The companies believe they need 
to make enough revenues while the drug is under patent to finance the 
cost of additional research on beneficial products.  Although the need to 
recoup the cost of drug development is important, it should not preclude 
measures needed to protect the public.  Congress should examine directly 
whether some adjustment should be made.  Congress has provided patent
and nonpatent extensions to deal with circumstances found legislatively 
convincing, such as a limited extension in patent life to reflect the time 
 148. COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., supra note 7, at 171.
149. Id. (recommending that the advertisement include “a caution” to speak to one’s 
doctor “about alternatives”). 
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needed to obtain FDA approval for a drug.150  Generous intellectual
property protections are available to encourage pediatric testing for drugs.151 
A possible approach for Congress to consider, if a solution is needed, 
is to provide some type of nonpatent extension before generics can be 
sold for drugs subject to a moratorium.  This extension, for example, 
might allow a one-month nonpatent extension for each year of the 
moratorium on DTC advertising.  Although this extension would delay
generics, the moratorium is part of a larger effort financed by the brand 
drugs to improve the safety of the drug.  The brand drugs, for example, 
must pay user fees to finance the improved surveillance system to permit
a better detection of postapproval risks, and they may have to do
postapproval studies.152  The moratorium is to permit doctors to have a 
better understanding of the postapproval risks before the drugs are 
promoted to consumers.  Any additional risks found would be reflected
in the advertisements in the extended period.  A small delay in generic 
availability can help balance the cost of providing this additional assurance 
of the safety of the brand drug and its generic version. 
The extension should not, of course, be an exact match for the length of 
the moratorium.  The drug company can sell the drug while the moratorium 
applies and can promote it to doctors.  Moreover, it ensures that the drug 
is promoted in a way that reduces the potential for risks, which is an
important concern. 
V. REPRINTS ON OFF-LABEL USES AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
This Part will start with a brief history of a complicated, important,
and unresolved issue on the extent to which constitutional protections
apply to manufacturer-distributed reprints of medical articles of studies 
funded by the company about an off-label use of an approved drug.  The
paper will discuss the Reprint Guidance Document issued by the Bush
administration indicating that the Agency does not intend to consider 
nonmisleading distributions by a company of reprints about an off-label 
150. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(B) (2006); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product 
Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research 
and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 483 (2003). 
151. See Nat’l Pharm. Alliance v. Henney, 47 F. Supp. 2d 37, 38–40 (D.D.C. 1999); 
LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 879–80 (2d ed. 2007). 
 152. Gilhooley, supra note 88, at 363; see also FDA Amendments Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 905(d), 121 Stat. 823, 949. 
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use of the drug to doctors as showing “intent” that the product be used
for an unapproved use.153  The paper will examine the questionable and 
ambiguous legal basis for the Reprint Guidance’s position on whether a 
distribution is evidence of intent for an unapproved use.  This dispute 
also highlights the importance of the characterization of the manufacturer’s 
activity as promotional or part of a scientific exchange of ideas. If the
Obama administration revised the Reprint Guidance, a constitutional
challenge may follow, including whether the distribution is commercial 
speech or public speech that receives more protection.  The Allergan
case may also raise these issues.154 
This paper maintains that manufacturer-initiated general distributions 
of reprints are in many cases rightly regarded as a promotion of an
unapproved use.  In light of the unresolved issues and the dissent’s 
proportionality test in Western States,155 this Part will consider whether
manufacturer-initiated distribution of reprints on off-label uses are 
acceptable in some limited circumstances without Agency approval.
This effort will consider whether an off-label use could have studies that
are sufficiently reliable that the use could potentially become generally 
recognized as safe and effective (GRAS/E), and thus, by definition, not 
be new drug use.156  An Agency policy based on that potential for GRAS/E
recognition, though, would involve adequate disclosures by the manufacturer 
with the distribution about factors that affect the reliability of the study,
some prior review of the disclosures by the Agency, and supplemental 
testing and postmarket surveillance when needed. 
A.  History of Constitutional Dispute and WLF Litigation 
Sharp divisions exist on the extent to which commercial speech
protects drug manufacturers who send doctors reprints from medical 
journals of articles about unapproved uses of the manufacturer’s drug. 
FDA has long accepted that doctors may use approved drugs “off-label” 
as part of the traditional practice of medicine based on their professional
judgment and medical articles.157  FDA also accepts that drug companies 
153. Reprint Guidance, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694 (Jan. 13, 2009). 
154. See Allergan v. FDA, No. 1:09-cv-01879-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2010); supra
note 20. 
155. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
156. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2006). 
157. See Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for
Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 37
Fed. Reg. 16,503 (Aug. 15 1972); Gilhooley, supra note 40, at 828–32. 
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may distribute reprints of journal articles about an off-label use in 
response to an unsolicited request from a doctor.158 
On the other hand, in the past, the Agency advised that manufacturer-
initiated distributions about an off-label use would be impermissible 
when they were intended to promote the drug for an unapproved use.159 
The Agency position, though, was found to violate commercial speech
protections in 1998 by a district court in a lawsuit brought by the 
Washington Legal Foundation.160 
In 1997, Congress enacted a “safe harbor” that exempted the
manufacturers who distributed reprints on new uses from needing prior
approval if the manufacturer submitted a supplemental NDA to the 
Agency to undertake any additional studies that were needed.161  When 
the statute was challenged, the district court regarded the provision 
calling for submission of a supplemental NDA as “constitutional
blackmail.”162 The decision was vacated by the court of appeals without 
reaching the merits on the basis of the Agency’s position that the statute 
and Agency guidance were safe harbors and not binding determinations 
of the legal requirements for all distributions.163  In the aftermath of the
decision, it became “common” for drug companies to send out reprints 
on an off-label use with a disclosure about the lack of Agency approval,
and “FDA did not attempt to stop them.”164 This “[b]ehavior on the 
ground” has been seen as “the best indicator of perceptions of the state
of the law.”165 
158. 61 Fed. Reg. 52,801 (Oct. 8, 1996).  This dispute also encompasses continuing
medical education (CME) programs organized by independent organizations funded by
drug manufacturers.  The CME issue is not dealt with here. 
159. Id.
160. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74 (D.D.C. 1998), 
amended sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999),
vacated in part and appeal dismissed, Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 
(D.C. Cir. 2000). 
161. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3 (Supp. III 1994) (expired pursuant to Pub. L. No. 105-
115, 111 Stat. 2364 (1997), and 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Nov. 20, 1998)).  Although this 
provision has expired by its terms, it can still be influential as a benchmark.  For 
background, see Czaban & Levitt, supra note 48, at 405–08. 
162. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
163. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d at 331; Czaban & Levitt, supra note 
48, at 405–08. 
164. Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label 
Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1559 (2009). 
165. Id.
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B.  Bush Administration Reprint Guidance 
In the closing days of the Bush administration, the Agency issued a 
final Reprint Guidance document recognizing that the “public health can 
be served” when doctors receive journal articles on unapproved uses.166 
In the case of manufacturer-initiated distributions of a reprint about off-
label uses, the Agency took the position that it “does not intend to 
consider the distribution of such medical and scientific information in 
accordance with the recommendations in [the] guidance as establishing 
intent that the product be used for an unapproved use.”167  The Guidance’s 
more expansive approach to what is “promotional” raises legal issues 
that are discussed in the next subsection.  Under the Guidance, the
information in the distributed article must not be false or misleading, and 
the distribution must be accompanied by discourses about the lack of
FDA approval, funding by the company for any author, and any safety
concerns known to the manufacturer that are not discussed in the article.168 
According to an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, the 
“loosening” of restrictions on the use of reprints made by the Guidance 
could “present challenges for medical journals, as companies seek to
ensure that their products are described favorably in articles.”169  According 
to the article, private enforcement actions and criminal prosecutions 
under fraud and abuse statutes may “help fill the regulatory gap” in the 
absence of FDA action.170 
C.  Legal Issues with Basis for Reprint Guidance
The Reprint Guidance has an ambiguous basis for its position.  That 
position could have a legal basis or a constitutional one, or simply be an 
enforcement policy.  All of these alternatives present difficulties. 
1.  Legal Basis for Determining Intent and Promotion
a.  Scope of Promotional Distributions
In the Reprint Guidance, the Agency stated that it did not “intend” to 
regard nonpromotional distributions of nonmisleading scientific information 
in accordance with the Guidance to be evidence of intent that the product 
 166. Reprint Guidance, supra note 19, at 7. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 5, 7. 
169. Mello et al., supra note 164, at 1557. 
170. Id. at 1561–65 (reviewing prosecutions and private litigation). 
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be used for an unapproved purpose.  The Guidance gives the illustration 
that a reprint could be distributed at medical conferences in connection 
with scientific exchanges but not in promotional settings in the exhibit
halls at the conference.171 
The Guidance failed to address, though, the significance of widespread 
distributions to doctors by a drug company of reprints of studies, funded
by the company, of new uses of their drug as a basis for determining a
promotional aim.  This includes distributions of reprints that are prepackaged
or involve mass mailings by the manufacturer, which can lead to a wide 
distribution in interstate commerce of drugs for uses that may be risky.
Distributions like these can be promotional because they encourage wide
off-label drug use.  This factor may make the determination fact-dependent
and make “as applied” review appropriate.172 
The Guidance also characterizes reprints distributed to doctors by a 
“sales representative” in a doctor’s office as promotional if distributed 
with promotional material or if accompanied by a discussion during the
sales visit.173 The clear implication is that a handout by the sales
representative without comment is not promotional.  This is inappropriate
because the handout brings the off-label use to the physician’s attention 
and can suggest an endorsement by the company.  The Guidance needs 
to be revised to provide a broader test for what is promotional. 
The Guidance also fails to acknowledge adequately that in some cases 
the labeling provisions have been interpreted broadly to reach any 
material, including advertisements, that explain the purpose of the 
product, even if the material is not physically attached.174  If the distribution 
were viewed as an intended promotion of the drug for an unapproved use 
by the company, like an advertisement to doctors, the distribution would 
be barred by the Agency’s advertising regulations.175 
 171. Reprint Guidance, supra note 19, at 6; see also supra Part IV.B. 
172. For merits in general of “as applied” review, see Edward A. Hartnett, Modest 
Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative 
Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735 (2006). 
173. See Reprint Guidance, supra note 19, at 6.
174. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348–49 (1948).  The label for the drug
must also contain adequate information about all of its intended uses as determined from 
any relevant source.  Alberty Food Prods. v. United States, 185 F.2d 321, 326–27 (9th 
Cir. 1950). 
175. Prescription Drug Advertising, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4) (2009). 
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b.  Impact on Jurisdiction over Misleading Statements 
The Agency’s jurisdiction over misleading labeling for any drug
depends upon a showing that that the drug is “intended” to prevent or 
treat disease or to affect the body.176  If a distribution does not constitute 
an intended use, the Agency would not be able to regulate misleading 
statements.  Thus the Agency would not seem to have any jurisdiction if 
a sales representative distributed to a doctor, without comment, a reprint 
with false and misleading statements, even though the Guidance is not 
intended to apply to reprints with such statements.177 
c.  Complexity of Issue 
The Guidance also raises unresolved questions at the frontiers of the
Agency’s jurisdiction about the basis for determining “intent,” “labeling,” 
and “promotional.”178  That debate is dramatically illustrated by FDA’s
effort to regulate tobacco as a drug because of the manufacturer’s 
knowledge of the addictive effect of nicotine on the body, the manipulation 
of the nicotine level, and the foreseeable consumer use for that effect.179 
The companies argued that intent is only established by express drug 
claims by the manufacturer.  The Court, though, in Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, decided it did not need to resolve the meaning of 
intent because even if FDA were correct, the Agency would lose on 
other statutory grounds.180 
The Court’s deliberate decision not to resolve the meaning of intent
leaves the outer scope of the Agency’s jurisdiction unsettled.  Perhaps 
the Court wanted to avoid a simple resolution to a question whose
consequences for the range of drug issues was not clear.  The practical
lesson about the complexity of the issues would seem to be the
176. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2006). 
 177. Reprint Guidance, supra note 19, at 6. 
178. The Guidance also fails to acknowledge adequately that, in some cases, the 
labeling provisions have been interpreted broadly to reach any material, including
advertisements, that explain the purpose of the product even if the material is not 
physically attached.  See Kordel, 355 U.S. at 348–49. 
179. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126–29 (2000). 
Some appellate courts have upheld a broad reading of intent, including Judge Friendly
finding that “objective evidence” could establish intent in a case involving dietary
supplements.  Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 789 (2d Cir. 1974). 
A district court rejected “foreseeable use” as the basis for finding intent that drugs would
be used off-label for pediatric use.  Ass’n of Am. Physicians v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204,
215–18 (D.D.C. 2002).  The Agency did not appeal the decision, and Congress later provided
incentives to encourage pediatric testing. See HUTT ET AL. supra note 52, at 642–44. 
180. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 131–32. 
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desirability of looking for alternative means to address the dispute.  This
will be explored below after considering the other basis that may be thought 
to support the Reprint Guidance.
2. Reprints as Constitutionally Protected Scientific Exchanges? 
The Reprint Guidance characterizes the distribution of reprints as one
that relates to “medical and scientific information.”181 The Agency also 
states that it issued the Guidance in “recognition of the public health
value to health care professionals of receiving truthful . . . information.”182 
If the distributions were to be characterized as part of a scientific
exchange, they may receive the highest constitutional protections 
available, like that accorded to public discussion and political speech. 
Drawing the line between public discourse and commercial speech is
not an easy one.183  A relevant test, though, is to consider whether the
speech is intended by the manufacturer to increase the sales of a particular
product.184  The test can reach a manufacturer’s distribution of reprints
of articles.  The characterization issue has some resemblance to the 
question of whether legal academics who distribute reprints of their 
articles to other professors are doing so to advance legal knowledge, to 
promote their reputation, or to do both.  A dual motive, in the case of
distributions by a drug company, warrants classifying the activity as 
commercial speech because the effect and aim can be to encourage sales
of a specific product.  In determining the manufacturer’s intent it would
also be relevant to know the basis for the selection by the manufacturer
of the reprints it chooses to distribute.  For example, does the company
only distribute reprints favorable to the drug that are funded by the 
company?  The distribution may also come with some sort of cover letter 
that may seem like an endorsement of the new use. 
 181. Reprint Guidance, supra note 19, at 7. 
182. Id. at 4.
183. See Symposium, supra note 10, at 336–42 (describing differences between
Professors Chemerinsky, Shiffrin, and Sullivan on the aims of the First Amendment and 
its relevance in identifying the scope of commercial speech).
184. See Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp, 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983); Symposium,
supra note 10, at 341–42, 354–55 (citing remarks of Erwin Chemerinsky identifying the 
test for commercial speech).
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3.  Adequacy of Enforcement Policy Basis 
If the Guidance reflects an enforcement position, it limits the 
Agency’s concern with preventing deception and having disclosures and
has an unduly narrow test for what is promotional.  The statute, though,
requires Agency approval for any new use of a drug intended by the 
manufacturer.  The enforcement position completely ignores the Agency’s
broader responsibility under the statute. Although the Agency enforcement 
priorities are usually not judicially reviewable, review is available if the
Agency adopts an express policy that is “so extreme as to amount to an 
abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”185 
D. Alternative Basis for Distributions and Process              
for Determination 
The discussion below will consider alternative bases that might justify 
manufacturer-distributed reprints in limited circumstances.  The discussion 
will then turn to the potential for additional safety risks from off-label
uses described in reprints and the problem of relying solely on disclosures 
as a safeguard.  The aim is to see if there are “proportional” means to
promote public safety instead of having a blanket restriction on any 
reprints about off-label uses.  Admittedly, the effort outlined below is 
complicated and reflects the challenges in developing intermediate 
proportional approaches.  The better alternative, discussed at the end of
this Part, may be to improve the research incentives and the circumstances 
in which the Agency should be able to require the manufacturer to 
undertake additional studies.  Although this discussion examines the 
circumstances in which a reprint might be considered GRAS/E, the steps
are relevant for a safe harbor or other bases that may be used to justify 
the distribution of reprints. 
1.  Distributions Based on GRAS/E Potential
Medical journals might contain a high-quality study on an off-label
use that is similar to an adequate and well-controlled study of the type
needed for approval of a NDA.  The study may be so good that experts 
in the field might accept that the off-label use is one that could become 
GRAS/E.  By definition a drug is not a new drug if it is GRAS/E.186  General
185. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).  But see Young v. Cmty. 
Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981–82 (1986) (deferring to the Agency’s interpretation of
a dangling participle).
186. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2006). 
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recognition depends, though, on adequate studies that have the same
quality and quantity as those needed for approval of a new drug.187   A
drug new to the market cannot have the experience by experts needed for 
general recognition.  On the other hand, when an approved drug is on the 
market, experts, as well as doctors, can become familiar with its other uses, 
including those in medical journals.  In unusual cases, the experience of
experts combined with high-quality studies might be sufficient to make
the new off-label use GRAS/E.188  If a reprint has that degree of general
recognition, a manufacturer would seem to be able to distribute it without 
Agency approval.  The Agency would still have jurisdiction over the drug
with respect to misleading labeling or promotions. 
General recognition is virtually impossible to exist, though, for a 
newly published journal article.  It takes time for experts to read and 
assess an article and come to a general acceptance.  Moreover, off-label
uses can have unexpected postmarket risks.  When the Agency believes
an article about an off-label use is in the zone of potentially being 
GRAS/E, the Agency might exercise its enforcement discretion and rely 
on disclosures, if they are adequate, rather than to test how close the off-
label use has come to being generally recognized. 
2.  Adequate Disclosures and Agency Review 
In this setting, adequate disclosures by the company are especially 
needed to avoid misleading impressions about matters that can affect the 
assessment of the reliability of the study that relate to patient safety and 
whether experts would recognize the new use as GRAS/E.189  The discussion 
below will deal with the process for Agency review of disclosures and the
187. Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 629 (1973) 
(finding that “general recognition” depends upon the same quantity and quality of
scientific evidence needed for approval of an NDA); 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h) (2009).  The 
Court recognized that “in some cases” recognition “might be made” without that level of
support, but the reach of the inquiry is the same.  Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 
U.S. 645, 652–53 (1973). 
188. The labeling approved for use of over-the-counter aspirin in reducing the risk
of Transient Ischamatic Attacks provides an illustration of a drug that became GRAS/E
for a new use based on published studies without having an approved new drug
application for the use. See Background and Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,802 (Oct. 23, 1998). 
189. In judging whether a matter is misleading, material omissions are considered. 
21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2006). 
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need for more studies when drug companies distribute reprints on off-
label uses on such a basis. 
3.  Disclosures and Prior Review 
The determination about the need for disclosures and additional studies 
is appropriately made before the reprint is distributed.  Prior review is
constitutionally suspect, but the Court has stated that it may be more 
acceptable for commercial speech because it is “hardier.”190  Prior review
by the Agency of the distribution planned by the company is needed 
because experts, as well as doctors, cannot have enough familiarity with 
a newly published article to permit general recognition.  The Agency
may appropriately use its enforcement discretion if the reprinted article
may win general recognition.  Until that occurs, though, prior review 
provides a safeguard to ensure that there are nonmisleading disclosures. 
As a result of the review, the Agency might then request the manufacturer 
to provide more disclosures with the distributed the reprint.  If the company
failed to do so, the Agency may find the distribution misleading and take 
enforcement action or pursue other measures.  If the distribution planned 
by the manufacturer is misleading, commercial speech does not protect
it.  The discussion below will deal with the types of disclosures that may
be needed and will then examine whether the Constitution will allow the 
Agency to require more studies in case the Agency believes that disclosures 
are not enough.  The Agency may also reexamine the intended use of the 
drug in light of the distribution.
4. Disclosures on Factors that Affect Assessment of Reliability 
Under this approach, the manufacturer should have the responsibility
for making adequate disclosures in the accompanying statement of any
matters that affect the assessment of the reliability or independence of
the study.  The disclosures should cover matters like those noted below. 
a.  Disclosures on Funding of Authors, “Ghostwriting,”
and Conflicts of Interest
The Reprint Guidance calls for drug companies that distributed 
reprints to disclose in an accompanying statement any compensation made
to an “author” of a study, whether credited or not, who meets the standards 
190. See Ctr. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
564 n.6, 571 n.13 (1980). 
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for authorship.191  This disclosure will provide help in understanding the
potential for conflict of interest.  Moreover, it helps in dealing with
“ghostwriting” of medical articles, which has emerged as a major concern. 
Recently, a company was reported to have hired a ghostwriter to write
articles favorable to a drug and then to help submit the article to a target
journal.192  A newspaper article also reported that the “[s]cientific integrity 
of medical research has been clouded in recent years by articles that
were drafted by drug company-sponsored ghostwriters and then passed
off as the work of independent academic writers.”193 
Under the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America’s 
(PhRMA) recently revised Principles on Clinical Trials, the author has
the responsibility for identifying in the journal article any individuals 
who provided assistance and the funding source.194  The author is also to 
disclose the role, if any, of the study sponsor in study design,
interpretation of data, and writing of the report.195  These matters are so
important that the drug sponsor who distributes a reprint should disclose 
in the accompanying statement any role of the sponsor in design, 
interpretation, and writing of the study.  Any funding of contributors to
an article should also be disclosed even though their role is less than that 
of an author.196  These disclosures are needed in the accompanying 
statement, even if they are also given in the article because of the
manufacturer’s role in distributing the reprint to a wider audience. 
When the manufacturer distributes a reprint, the company has the
responsibility to be sure the author’s disclosures are adequate with
respect to any matter known to the manufacturer. 
 191. Reprint Guidance, supra note 19, at 7 & n.8. 
192. See Natasha Singer, Medical Papers by Ghostwriters Pushed Therapy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at A1; Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to Raynard S.
Kington, Acting Dir., Nat’l Inst. Health, Aug. 11, 2009, available at http://www.npr.org/ 
assets/blogs/health/images/2009/08/nihletter.pdf. 
193. Natasha Singer & Duff Wilson, Unmasking the Ghosts: Medical Editors Take
On Hidden Writers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, at B1.  Some journals are barring
ghostwriting for opinion pieces. Id.
 194. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFG. AM., PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT OF CLINICAL TRIALS
17 (2009), available at http://www.phrma.org/files/attachments/042009_Clinical%20Trial
%20Principles_FINAL.pdf. 
195. Id.
196. Id.  The Reprint Guidance calls for disclosures of the funding by the company
for “any author.”  See Reprint Guidance, supra note 19, at 7. 
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b.  Conflicts of Interest and Difference from Agency Role 
The disclosure requirements for journal authors highlight a key 
difference between medical journal writers and the FDA role.  FDA 
reviewers cannot have conflicts of interest.  Medical article writers can
have conflicts so long as they are disclosed.  As the industry recognizes,
in the “strict sense, some conflict of interest may exist in all research
settings,” but there may only be a limited number of physicians who are 
“best qualified” to enroll sufficient patients in a study.197 
c.  Access to Database for Off-Label Uses 
FDA reviewers have access to the full database for a study when FDA
approval is sought.  The Agency can examine the database to make an
independent statistical analysis.  That review may spot risk signals as it
did in the case of Vioxx.198  In the case of an off-label use described in a
medical article, the Agency does not have that access because the
Agency’s approval has not been sought.
The investigators and journal reviewers, though, may have a more 
limited access to the data about the study than FDA would have.  The 
database “is owned by the sponsor,” and intellectual property protections 
are considered in making disclosures.199  Under the 2009 standards, a
sponsor will “seek” to provide “meaningful access” to investigators of 
clinical data for multiclinic trials, and “authors” will be given all data 
“needed” to support publication.200  The drug sponsor will provide a
“synopsis of the clinical trial protocol” when requested by a medical journal 
that is reviewing a submitted manuscript “with the understanding that
such documents are confidential and should be returned to the sponsor.”201 
d.  Access by Blind Reviewers
Medical journals use “blind reviewers” to perform a role that seems
similar in some respects to that of the Agency.  It is not clear, though,
how much blind reviewers examine the full database and whether they
 197. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFG. AM., supra note 194, at 16. 
198. See supra Part III for the scope of the medical review for Vioxx. 
 199. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFG. AM., supra note 194, at 19.  In 2002, the drug 
companies stated that as owners of the database they have “discretion” in providing access,
and in general, “study databases are only made available to regulatory authorities.”  See
Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution After Western States, 37 U.
RICH. L. REV. 901, 923–25 & n.126 (2003); see supra Part V.D.3.a. 
 200. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFG. AM., supra note 194, at 19. 
201. See id. at 24–25. 
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would be able to obtain access if they sought it.  Without that type of 
independent review, the journal articles on off-label uses do not have the 
same double-check on the validity of the study that comes from the 
Agency’s review of an approved use.  Although these matters involve 
matters of scientific research judgment, consideration seems needed of a
disclosure on the extent to which the blind reviewers and other medical 
journal reviewers and investigators sought and obtained the full database 
in order to do an independent analysis. 
e.  Difference Between Criteria for Medical        
Journals and Distributions 
Medical journal editors rightly use their scientific and editorial judgment
in determining the criteria for publication.  The evaluation of the adequacy
of the article in journals is not a matter for government decision.  The 
disclosures that authors should make in the journal are also ones for the 
journal, not the Agency, to decide. 
On the other hand, if the drug sponsor distributes reprints of an article 
to doctors, the distribution goes beyond being an exchange of scientific 
information, and as discussed above, it has a promotional aspect because
of the effect it can have in increasing sales for a particular product.  When
distributing a reprint, the sponsor should make disclosures in the 
accompanying statement about funding, any role in study design and
writing, and the limits on access to data as discussed above.  That
information seems especially relevant for doctors to consider in evaluating
a use with a wide health impact.  Moreover, it seems a relevant consideration
for the Agency to take into account in determining whether the study is
GRAS/E and whether additional evaluation or studies are needed.
E.  Need for Additional Testing 
As discussed below, disclosures may not be enough to protect the
public or to provide a potential basis for finding that the use may be one 
that is or could become GRAS/E.  The Agency should be able to call for 
more testing and in appropriate circumstances, provide for its being done 
while the reprint is being distributed. 
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1. Potential Safety Issues 
Medical articles on off-label uses can involve important risk not dealt
with in the initial approval.  For example, suppose a drug was approved 
for short-term pain relief.  Later, a medical study funded by the drug 
company and distributed to doctors reports that the drug can reduce the 
incidence of heart attacks when taken on a continuing basis at a higher 
dose by those at risk.  The new use is for chronic, rather than short-term,
use and at a higher dose. Moreover, if the drug does not work to reduce 
heart attacks, it can have indirect safety consequences by diverting the
doctor from using another treatment that might be available.  These 
differences could lead to significant safety harm.  The new use would 
also not likely be one that has sufficient use to be GRAS/E in these 
circumstances.  Moreover, the experience with Vioxx has illustrated the 
potential for postapproval risks from any drug.202  That potential warrants
additional surveillance and, in some cases, additional testing. 
2. Additional Testing and Supplemental New Drug            
Application, Timing, and Disclosures 
The Agency should be able, when needed, to require the manufacturer 
to undertake additional testing when the manufacturer has initiated
distributions and important unresolved safety questions exist about the
safety of the new use or its effectiveness.  In determining whether there
is a specific need, the Agency should take into account the disclosures 
suggested above that can affect the reliability of the study.  For example, 
if the study is largely written by nonacademic contributors, with funding 
from the company, the Agency clearly may seek to have the company
file a supplemental application to enable the Agency to call for confirmatory
testing needed to substantiate the findings.  That testing might be done 
after the distribution of the article. Congress provided for that alternative 
earlier, and it still provides a model on the options for the timing of the 
testing.203 
202. See supra Part III.A (summarizing the IOM’s recommendation on the need for
improved postmarket surveillance and changes in the Agency’s authority); supra Part 
III.B (describing the cardiovascular risks found after approval); see also supra Part III 
for a discussion of Vioxx. 
203. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3(d)(2) (Supp. III 1994) (expired pursuant to Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 111 Stat. 2364 (1997), and 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Nov. 20, 1998)).
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3. Postmarket Surveillance 
If the manufacturer is distributing reprints about off-label uses that 
encourage wide use, provision should be made for postmarket
surveillance and testing for the unexpected risks the drug may pose.  The 
need is similar to that for newly approved drugs. 
F. Commercial Speech Restraints 
If the Agency were to seek to have a company submit a supplemental
NDA to do additional studies, a constitutional challenge may occur.  Under 
Western States, these measures may be considered more restrictive than 
necessary because a disclosure to the doctor about the lack of studies on 
the issue would be sufficient.  When the questions about the support for 
the study involve safety risks to a large number of patients, though, 
Congress and the Agency should be able to decide that more protection
of the public is needed.  If, for example, the company distributes a study 
about the stroke prevention benefit of a pain pill at a high dose, the 
Agency might be concerned if the study in the medical article is poorly
controlled or has been ghostwritten or had a short duration.  The wide 
use of the article based on the reprint distributed by the company could 
create a large risk.  Although a disclosure with the reprint about the problems
may affect prescribing habits that should not be the only remedy available,
the need to prevent harm to the public should be given its due weight. 
G.  A Better Alternative: Research Incentives for FDA-Approved 
Research and Improved Postapproval-   
Risk Tracking 
1. Limited Incentive 
Manufacturers have been concerned with the lack of research 
incentives to do additional research on their approved drug.  The law 
already gives the brand manufacturer three years of market exclusivity
for research when FDA approves a supplemental NDA for the new use 
for the drug.204  The economic benefit, however, is limited.  Once the 
patent and other exclusivity periods expire on the original use of the
brand drug, the generic drug can be marketed for the primary use. 
204. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(D)(iv) (2006). 
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Although the generic drug cannot make any claim for the supplemental 
use, doctors can prescribe the drug for the additional use, and some states
and insurance companies might even require generic substitution.205  A court
rejected the argument of a drug company that the research exclusivity 
should preclude any generic availability until the end of the three-year 
period of exclusivity.206 
The limited incentives at present for additional research on a marketed 
drug may provide an added reason for manufacturers to believe in the 
importance of commercial speech protections.  If they had a more
meaningful research incentives, perhaps they might seek to get a new
use approved as a supplemental use rather than distribute medical journal
articles they fund about off-label uses.  In some settings, Congress has
recognized the relevance of the lack of market incentives in determining
what studies companies should be expected to do on off-label uses.207 
2.  Improving Reporting and Risk Identification for  
Off-Label Uses 
Providing incentives for obtaining FDA approval of an off-label use 
may also provide a better means of monitoring the risks from off-label
uses.  The testing for approved drugs is not adequate to detect all risks 
that may occur in use, as discussed above.  Similar issues may well arise
with new off-label uses reported in medical journals, and especially so if 
the new use is for a more serious condition or a longer duration of use 
than that for which the initial approval was obtained. 
The way that the risks from off-label uses are reported on the drug 
label needs further examination.  Under FDA’s regulations, the physician
drug labeling needs to be revised to “[i]nclude a warning about a clinically
significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal 
association with a drug; [however] a causal association need not have
been definitively established.”208 
Although risks from off-label uses can be reflected in the warnings,
the statement is not to be “promotional.”209  It may be difficult, though,
to identify fully the risks from a specific off-label use without seeming 
205. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
206. Id. at 1500; see NOAH, supra note 151, at 869–70; Eisenberg, supra note 150, at 482. 
207. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3(d)(2) (expired).  Congress provided that the Agency could
exempt a company from having to do an additional study when the company distributed
reprints on an off-label use if the studies were “economically prohibitive” taking into account 
factors such as the lack of availability of exclusive marketing.
208. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2009). 
209. Allergan Government Reply, supra note 21. 
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to recognize or encourage the use.  Without a more specific description, 
doctors may not have an optimal basis to evaluate whether an off-label use 
described in reprints continues to be warranted in light of emerging risks. 
The difficulties, though, go deeper. There does not seem to be any 
special provision for postmarket surveillance of new off-label uses.  The 
manufacturer does not seem to be obliged to pay “user fees” to track
risks from off-label uses that are described in reprints distributed by the 
company.  If the off-label use leads to new risks, there does not seem to 
be any expectation at present that the manufacturer who distributed the 
journal article will inform recipients of the additional risks. 
3.  Possible Scope of Incentive 
Given these difficulties, consideration is needed to giving the drug 
manufacturer an incentive to obtain approval from the Agency for sound
research on off-label uses.  One approach is for Congress to provide a 
strong three-year exclusivity period for adequate studies to support a 
new use, without blocking the generic availability of the drug for its 
primary original use when the patent for the original use ends.210 
Perhaps it might be possible to do so while encouraging better postmarket-
risk reporting for the new use.  To return to the example given above,
suppose a drug has been approved for pain and the manufacturer submits 
a supplemental NDA to FDA based on medical studies for a benefit in 
stroke prevention from the drug.  If FDA approved the new use, the 
expanded use might receive a special designation such as having an “S-
P” designation added to the name to indicate the particular use, and the
pill might be given a different color or form.211  Doing so should permit 
better identification of the side effects and risks from the supplemental use. 
Although it might not be possible to stop doctors from substituting the
generic for the new form of the drug, the aim would be to discourage them
from doing so in order to better monitor the new risk and to preserve the value
of the research incentive provided.  Insurance reimbursement should be 
based on whether a code for a stroke risk was designated as the reason for 
210. See Part V.G.1 for difficulties with present incentive.
211. An analogy is provided to the exclusivity protections for prescription drugs 
when they become over-the-counter.  See Gilhooley, supra note 51, at 29 & n.146 (noting
exclusivity against generic OTC products for Prilosec OTC). 
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the doctor visit and the prescription because that designation promotes a
better understanding of the risk from the new use.212 
There is a risk, of course, that a drug company might first distribute 
reprints about off-label uses and later submit a supplemental NDA to
substantiate the benefit and obtain the added economic incentives for the 
research.  This creates a tension with the aim of providing the expanded 
incentive because the weaknesses in determining the risks from the off-
label uses will occur when it is based on the distributed reprint.  Perhaps 
the period of added exclusivity should be reduced if the company does 
not submit the supplemental NDA to do the confirmatory research at the 
time the company initiates distribution of reprints. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Prescription drugs carry considerable risks, and this factor should 
carry special weight in assessing whether the constitutional protections 
for commercial speech permit speech restrictions.  The best approach
might be to revise the commercial speech test to recognize the importance
of the protection of the public health as a separate prong.  The alternative 
is to endorse the test stated in the dissent in Western States.  That test
takes account of the “proportionality” between the possible risk and the 
aim and duration of the restriction.  This paper explores how that test 
might work in the areas in which there has been debate and criticism of
the application of commercial speech to drug regulation. Although the
safety-focused proportionality test has uncertainties and presents challenges
for the Agency, it holds the promise for greater public protection.
The paper suggests that a moratorium on DTC advertising for drugs 
should be permissible under the proportionality test for important 
categories of drugs, including those with specific risk factors. These
include advertisements for drugs for which risk signals have been found, 
those in a new therapeutic class, or for use by patients at special risk,
such as those with a serious acute condition.  In addition, a moratorium
seems warranted in the interest of protecting the public health when 
scientists believe there is substantial uncertainty about the potential for
added risk from a drug that will be widely used.213  The potential for
additional safety risks for drugs like these seems sufficient to warrant a
delay in the consumer advertisements.  That delay in advertisements
212. A different outcome seems warranted if the doctor entered a do-not-substitute order 
or its equivalent. 
213. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3) (Supp. I 2006) for criteria under which the Agency
may require postapproval studies. 
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permits doctors to learn about the extent of the risks from postmarket 
surveillance as well as their experience before general promotion to the
public starts.  If the Agency believes that the DTC advertisements pose a 
potential significant potential safety risk to the general public, the 
Agency should seek to have a moratorium.  A direct test is warranted on 
the scope of the protections for commercial speech when that speech
may adversely affect the public health. 
The other focus of the paper is on company-initiated distributions to
doctors of reprints of medical articles about a study of a new off-label 
use of an approved drug.  The distribution of the reprint can encourage 
the new use by making it more widely known to doctors and by seeming
to have the endorsement of the company.  In the past the Agency 
regarded many company-initiated distributions as subject to the drug 
approval requirements, but a lower court found those distributions to be 
constitutionally protected in a decision that was vacated on other grounds.214 
The Reprint Guidance issued at the end of the Bush administration took
the position that the Agency did not intend to regard “nonpromotional” 
distributions by the company about nonmisleading studies as providing 
evidence of an intended use of the drug.215  The distribution, though, 
must be nonmisleading and disclose safety risks that are not discussed in
the article but are known to the manufacturer.  This paper examines the 
statutory and policy difficulties with the Bush Guidance, and some
alternatives that might be considered.216  The Obama administration has
now accepted that conduct outlined in the Reprint Guidance “is not 
unlawful” in the context of the Allergan case.217  The Reprint Guidance, 
though, has an unduly narrow approach for determining what is “promotional,”
and therefore it needs to be revised. 
This Article explores alternatives to identify when distributing reprints 
on off-label uses should be considered acceptable by building on 
214. See supra Part V.A; see also Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999). 
215. See Reprint Guidance, supra note 19; see supra Part V.B. 
216. The discussion in Part V.D also explores an alternative basis that might warrant, in
limited circumstances, the manufacturer’s distribution of medical articles when the use 
described in this Article may be generally recognized by experts as safe and effective.
The need to improve the research incentives for better testing is also explored.
217. Allergan Government Reply, supra note 21, at 9. 
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alternatives that Congress accepted in the past.218  As discussed in Part 
V.D, if a manufacturer distributes reprints, at a minimum adequate
disclosures are needed with an opportunity for agency review.  A 
disclosure of information that can affect the assessment of the reliability
of the study should accompany the reprint.  This should include any role 
of the company in the interpretation of the study and in the funding of 
authors, contributors, or “ghostwriters.”  A disclosure also seems needed
on the extent to which the study investigators and medical journal 
reviewers sought and obtained the full database in order to do an 
independent analysis.  FDA should also be able to consider factors like 
these to determine that disclosures are not sufficient to guard against a
significant safety risk and that the drug manufacturer needs to submit a
supplemental NDA to undertake additional research.  Constitutional 
issues may be raised, though, if the Agency or Congress called for the 
drug manufacturer to do additional studies under a supplemental NDA.219 
The drug approval system, though, is not fundamentally one of providing
nondeceptive information.  Prior approval by the Agency of the safety
and efficacy of a drug is required before a new drug can be sold.  As the
D.C. Circuit found in Abigail Alliance,220 an unapproved drug cannot
constitutionally be sold, even to cancer patients, under the due process 
clause, simply with a disclosure about the lack of FDA approval or the 
lack of studies.  Doing so would undercut Congress’s legitimate concern 
with public safety, and it could undercut the testing system because few
may volunteer for controlled testing if they can get the hoped-for cure— 
based on disclosures—without having to participate in a real test.
Similar concerns arise with respect to off-label uses. The scope of the 
risk and benefit to the patients is best determined by controlled tests with 
an independent review by the Agency.  The manufacturer’s wide
distribution of these reprints is appropriately seen as being intended to
promote the off-label use and increase the sales of a particular product, 
and thus to be commercial speech,221 rather than simply an effort to 
advance a scientific exchange of ideas.  If drug companies can readily
distribute medical articles about off-label uses to doctors with simple 
218. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-6(b) (Supp. III 1994) (expired pursuant to Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 111 Stat. 2364 (1997), and 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Nov. 20, 1998)); see also
supra Part V.A. 
219. See Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81; Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d
51 (D.D.C. 1998). 
220. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 
495 F.3d 695, 703–06 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
221. See Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65–68 (1983); Symposium,
supra note 10, at 341–42, 354 (citing comments of Professor Chemerinsky). 
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disclosures about the lack of agency approval, the company may seek 
Agency approval for the easiest use to support, such as ordinary pain 
relief.  The more significant uses the drug may have, at a higher dose, 
with a closer risk-benefit balance may be the subject of medical articles that 
the company funds and distributes with disclosures about the lack of agency
approval.  The FDA approval system will become a mere preliminary.222 
Some may doubt that the Court will be willing to lessen the rigor of
commercial speech doctrine.  The Court’s recent decision in Wyeth v.
Levine, though, recognizes the importance of drug safety and that the 
drug maker has the “primary responsibility” to revise drug labeling to 
reflect new emerging risks when needed.223  Under Wyeth, tort liability is
not preempted unless there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would have 
rejected a new warning, which is not shown when the Agency gave no 
more than “passing attention” to the matter.224  A DTC moratorium gives
doctors and the Agency the opportunity to give more than “passing 
attention” to the significance of an emerging safety risk before consumers
are influenced by DTC advertisements to request a drug or pressure their
doctors to prescribe it.  Even if Wyeth is not read that broadly, the safety
risks that prescription drugs pose deserve more weight under the 
commercial speech test.
Decisions about the “best way to protect the health and safety of the 
American public” rightly belong to Congress, as the dissent in Western
States pointed out.  An “overly rigid” commercial speech doctrine could 
repeat the mistakes of the experience with substantive due process.225  If 
Congress is more restrictive than the public wants, the electorate can 
seek change.  The Court should be hesitant about putting drug safety
decisions beyond the reach of the elected branches of the government. 
222. See Mello et al., supra note 164, at 1563. 
223. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1197–98 (2009). 
224. Id. at 1198–99. 
225. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
see supra Part IV.B.2.e.
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